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Abstract—In this paper, we proposed a novel high-speed 
architecture to incorporate multiple stand-alone DDoS 
countering mechanisms. The architecture separates DDoS 
filtering mechanisms, which are algorithms, out of packet 
decoder, which is the basement. The architecture not only 
helps developers to give more concentration on optimizing 
algorithms but also integrate multiple algorithms to achieve 
more efficient DDoS defense mechanism. The architecture is 
implemented on reconfigurable hardware, which helps 
algorithms to be flexibly changed or updated. We implemented 
and experimented the system using NetFPGA 10G board with 
incorporation of Port Ingress/Egress Filtering and Hop-Count 
Filtering to classify IP spoofing packets. The synthesis results 
show that the system runs at 118.907 MHz, utilizes 38.99% 
Registers, and 44.75% BlockRAMs/FIFOs of the NetFPGA 
10G board. The system achieves the detection rate of 100% 
with false negative rate at 0%, and false positive rate closed to 
0.16%. The experimental results prove that the system achieves 
packet decoding throughput at 9.869 Gbps in half-duplex mode 
and 19.738 Gbps in full-duplex mode. 
 
Index Terms— Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS); FPGA; 




The Internet is growing fast, and it has become an important 
mechanism to connect people and devices together. For that 
reason, the number of Internet users is increasing. As of Oct 
24, 2015, there are more than 3.2 billion of users joined 
Internet [1], and it is increasing steadily. This increase will 
be a good chance for attackers to replicate malicious 
software (malware), steal personal user information and 
occupy computers for distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks.  
DDoS is a network attack method to prevent legitimate 
users from accessing network resources or services. The 
attacker performs DDoS attacks by consuming network's 
resources, or by consuming server's resources, or both of 
them. Attackers can perform attacks from one source (DoS), 
or from multiple sources (DDoS). Most of DDoS attacks use 
Internet Protocol (IP) address spoofing technique [2] that 
allows attackers to forge source IP address of a packet 
difference from its original address. Spoofer Project showed 
that 13.5% address space is spoofable [3]. The way routers 
route a packet is a vulnerability that attackers exploit to 
perform DDoS attacks. Network routers only check packets' 
IP destination address to make a routing decision, while 
source IP address is intact.  
In this paper, we proposed a novel architecture to detect 
and defend against DDoS attack based on IP spoofing 
technique. The architecture consists of two main 
components: Base System and DDoS Filtering. The Base 
System takes responsibility to extract header and store raw 
packets while waiting for classifying result from DDoS 
Filtering component. DDoS Filtering component classifies 
packets based on the header received from the Base System. 
DDoS Filtering component can include multiple filtering 
modules. We implemented Port Ingress/Egress Filtering 
(PIEF) and Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) module to counter 
DDoS attacks based on theory from [4] and [5].  
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 
• High-speed packet decoder: filtering modules are 
implemented in a Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) device. It takes advantage of hardware-based 
parallel processing, which is faster than software-
based implementation.  
• A novel model for DDoS's countermeasure 
mechanism: the proposed architecture separates 
packet decoder component, namely a basement, from 
Packet Filtering component, which implements 
algorithms. This architecture helps developers to 
implement filtering modules independently based on 
Packet decoder. 
• The Combination of PIEF and HCF for countering 
DDoS attacks: both implemented filtering modules 
are DDoS defense mechanisms that prevent IP 
spoofing attacks. This combination not only 
consolidates DDoS countering mechanisms but also 
proves that multiple filtering mechanisms can be 
incorporated to prevent DDoS attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section II 
describes DDoS attack and defense mechanisms and related 
work. Section III presents our proposed DDoS 
countermeasure. The implementation and experimental 
results are discussed in section IV. Section V concludes the 
paper and introduces future work. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
In this section, we present DDoS background and 
countermeasure methods to prevent DDoS attacks. 
 
A. Background 
Attackers often employ computers or zombies controlled 
through malwares to form a botnet to perform a DDoS 
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attack. They are usually motivated by incentives such as 
financial/economical gain, revenge, ideological belief, 
intellectual challenge or cyberwarfare [2]. Attacks which are 
for financial gain are dangerous and hard to mitigate. 
 
a. DDoS Attack Mechanisms 
Zargar et al. [2] classified DoS/DDoS attacks into two 
categories: network/transport-level and application-level 
flooding attack. Network/Transport-level based flooding 
attacks are performed by exploiting vulnerabilities of layer 2 
to layer 4 in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
network model to exhaust victim's network resources. 
Application-level based flooding attacks exploit application-
level vulnerabilities, including protocols and application 
code, to exhaust victim's server resources.  
Network/Transport-level based attacks are also 
categorized into 4 subcategories [2]; flooding attacks, 
protocols exploitation flooding attacks, reflection-based 
flooding attacks, and amplification-based flooding attacks. 
Flooding attacks often exhaust network resources by 
consuming bandwidth or overburdening network devices. In 
protocol exploitation attacks, attacker sends malformed 
packets, such as TCP SYN flood [6] [7] and TCP SYN/ACK 
flood [8], to confuse victim. In reflection and amplification 
based attacks, the attacker sends spoofed packets in which 
source address is victim's IP address to reflectors/amplifiers, 
then responses are sent to the victim and cause flooding (i.e., 
Smurf attack, Fraggle attack).  
Application-level based attacks exploit vulnerabilities of 
application protocol and application code. Attackers often 
exploit stateless protocols for this kind of attack, such as 
DNS, NTP. DNS amplification DDoS had been researched 
[9] [10] and recorded an attack with 300Gbps [10] [11]. 
NTP amplification DDoS sets a new record with 400Gbps in 
2014 [12] [13]. 
Attacker (i.e., Master) starts DDoS attacks by sending 
control message to bots (i.e., Agents) in a botnet to perform 
an attack. Attacker can control the botnet through Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) or HTTP-based command. 
 
b. DDoS Defense Mechanisms 
DDoS defense mechanisms are classified into network-
level and application-level [2]. Network-level based defense 
mechanism is deployed to mitigate DDoS attacks under 
network layers. It is also categorized into source-based, 
network-based, destination-based and hybrid mechanisms 
based on deployment location. PIEF method [4] can be 
deployed as a source-based or destination-based mechanism. 
In the destination-based mechanism, Management 
Information Base (MIB) [14] can be used to monitor traffic 
to detect DDoS attacks, HCF method [5] can filter out 
spoofed packet based on the number of routers a packet 
traversed. The paper [2] also introduces hybrid methods, 
such as Stop-It and Active Internet Traffic Filtering (AITF), 
which incorporate multiple components across network 
systems to counter DDoS attacks. Application-level based 
defense mechanism is deployed to detect application 
vulnerabilities attacks. CAPTCHAR [15] is an application-
based method to differentiate DDoS flooding bots from the 





B. Related Work 
This section introduces several methods for detecting 
spoofed packets, such as PIEF and HCF. 
Ferguson et al. [4] proposed Port Ingress/Egress Filtering 
method to filter spoofed packets. The ingress and egress 
name depends on its deployment position. Ingress filter is 
deployed to filter inbound traffic. If an incoming packet is 
spoofed, it is blocked. Egress filter filters outbound traffic to 
ensure that malicious packets will never leave internal 
network.  
Wang et al. [5] proposed a method named Hop-Count 
Filtering to filter spoofed packets based on the number of 
hops that packets traverse before arriving at the victim. Each 
packet traveling on the network has its own Time-To-Live 
(TTL). When a packet traverses a router (hop), its TTL 
value is decreased by one before forwarding to next hop. 
Therefore, packet's hop-count could not be spoofed. Hop-
count value is calculated by comparing initial TTL to final 
TTL value when the packet arrives at the destination. 
Packets whose TTL is equal to zero are dropped. While not 
being attacked, IP address and hop-count are collected and 
stored in IP-to-Hop-Count (IP2HC) tables. When DDoS 
attack occurs, packets' IP and hop-count value are compared 
to IP2HC records. If it does match an IP2HC record, it is a 
legitimate packet; otherwise, it is a spoofed packet and is 
dropped. The paper claimed that HCF can identify 90% of 
spoofed packets. 
Wang et al. [16] also proposed a distributed HCF (DHCF) 
model, which is implemented at intermediate routers. This 
method not only protects host but also protects the 
intermediate network from malicious packets and traffic 
congestion. Experimental results showed that DHCF 
achieved better performance than conventional HCF but 
maintained user's access. 
Ayman et al. [17] proposed an upgraded version of HCF, 
by storing multiple hop-count values according to multiple 
routes. This modified HCF method can increase true 
positive rate because a packet's hop-count values may vary 
if it travels through multiple routes. However, this method 
suddenly increases false negative rate, because it increases 
the chance to the attacker to bypass the detector. 
Maheshwari et al. [18] combined probabilistic and round 
trip time in Distributed Probabilistic HCF-Round trip time 
(DPHCF-RTT). Packets are checked once by intermediate 
DPHCF-RTT routers (nodes) and then they are forwarded to 
the victim. The larger number of intermediate routers 
implemented, the higher detection rate of malicious packets 




In this section, we describe our proposed DDoS 
countering architecture as shown in Figure 1. The 
architecture consists of two main components: Base System 




Figure 1: The architecture of DDoS countering system 
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A. Base System 
a. PreDecode 
This module decodes and extracts the IP header of 
incoming packets. Packets' header is transferred to filtering 
modules for classifying. Raw packets are stored in Packet 
FIFO while waiting for classifying results from filtering 
modules. Those packets' header includes source IP, 
destination IP and TTL value.  
 
b. Packet FIFO 
There are two approaches to process packets. The first 
approach, a packet is de-encapsulated into header and 
payload. Then, the header is sent to filtering modules to 
classify. Finally, if the packet is legitimate, header and 
payload are encapsulated and the packet is sent out to the 
network. If the packet is classified as DDoS, the packet is 
not encapsulated. This is time-consuming approach because 
encapsulation takes time. The second approach is to use a 
buffer to store full raw packets. This approach helps to 
reduce system latency. In this work, we implemented the 
second approach and named Packet FIFO.  
 
c. PostDecode 
The PostDecode module receives packets from the Packet 
FIFO module and waits for decisions from the Decision 
Maker module. The PostDecode module determines whether 
the packets are forwarded or dropped depending on the 
feedback of DDoS Filtering modules. If packets are 
legitimate, they are sent out to the network. Otherwise, they 
are dropped.  
 
B. DDoS Filtering 
In Section 2.4, several DDoS defense mechanisms are 
discussed. Each of those approaches only counters a specific 
DDoS attack. Therefore, those mechanisms do not 
completely classify DDoS attack packets in stand-alone 
mode. In this section, we present a combination of PIEF and 
HCF modules. This combination helps DDoS Filtering to 




Global and Specialized Address Blocks 
 
Address Block Present Use 
0.0.0.0/8 “This” network 
10.0.0.0/8 Private-Use Networks 
127.0.0.0/8 Loopback 
169.254.0.0/16 Link Local 
172.16.0.0/12 Private-Use Networks 
192.0.0.0/24 IETF Protocol Assignment 
192.88.99.0/24 6to4 Relay Anycast 
192.168.0.0/16 Private-Use Networks 




240.0.0.0/4 Reserved for Future Use 
255.255.255.255/32 Limited Broadcast 
 
a. Port Ingress/Egress Filtering 
In computer networking, ingress filtering is a technique 
used to make sure incoming packets are actually from their 
original network. Any router that implements ingress 
filtering method checks source IP address of traversing 
packets. The router drops the packets if its source IP address 
is not in the range of address that the router's interface is 
connecting. Table 1 shows IP address blocks for special use. 
Those IP addresses do not either appear or exist on the 






Figure 2: The architecture of Port Ingress/Egress Filtering module 
 
Figure 2 describes a diagram of PIEF module. When the 
packet's source IP address is sent to PIEF, The PIEF 
searches the IP in Content Addressable Memory (CAM). If 
a MISS signal returns (no record found in CAM), the packet 
is legitimate. Otherwise, the packet is illegitimate. After 
that, PIEF forwards MISS/HIT signal to Decision Maker. 
 
b. Hop-Count Filtering 
Although DDoS attackers can forge any field in the 
packets' header, they cannot falsify the number of hops that 
a packet traversed to reach its destination. The number of 
traversed hops of a packet, named hop-count, is calculated 
by subtracting the final TTL from the initial TTL. TTL is an 
8-bit field [19] in the IP header which originally introduced 
to specify the maximum lifetime of an IP packet on the 
Internet. The final TTL is the value when the packet reaches 
the destination. The initial TTL values are 30, 32, 60, 64, 
128, and 255 according to OS where the packet is made. 
Figure 3 shows the complete HCF algorithm. 
 
 
 Figure 3: The algorithm of Hop-Count Filtering module 
 
IP2HC table is important because it helps HCF to detect 
whether a packet is spoofed or not. CAM is used to store IP 
address in most FPGA-based system networking because of 
its fast query response. However, CAM can return index and 
an HIT/MISS signal only. Therefore, We store hop-count in 
Register Array instead of CAM. Furthermore, the 
incorporation of CAM and Register Array improves query 
time. The index of CAM and Register Array is direct one-to-
one mapping. If source IP address of a packet is stored in 
CAM at index k, the returned value of Register Array at 
index k is the hop-count value of that packet. Table 2 show 
how we implement IP2HC. When we look for IP address 
134.170.188.221, CAM returns an index of 1. Based on that 
index, Register Array returns 10 as a hop-count value of the 
IP address.  
Figure 4 describes the architecture of the HCF module. 
The module receives packets' source IP and final TTL from 
for  each packet: 
    extract the final TTL Tf and IP Address S; 
    infer the initial TTL Ti; 
    compute the hop-count Hc = Ti – Tf; 
    index S to get the stored hop-count Hs; 
    If (Hc # Hs) 
        packet is spoofed; 
    else  
        packet is legitimate; 
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the PreDecode module. This module calculates the hop-
count value, lookups IP address in CAM and gets the hop-
count value stored in the Register Array. If the returned hop-
count is equal to the calculated hop-count, the packet is 
legitimate. Otherwise, the packet is spoofed. For the first 
time the packets, whose source IP do not exist in CAM, 
come to the system, CAM returns a MISS signal and stores 
the packets’ IP and hop-count value. However, the initial 
TTL can be forged. It means that the packet is spoofed, but 
HCF could not recognize that. That is the main disadvantage 
and limitation of HCF mechanism. Therefore, we consider 
combining PIEF and HCF. 
 
Table 2  
IP to Hop-Count table  
 
CAM  Register Array 
Index IP Blocks  Index Hop-count value 
1 134.170.188.0/24  1 10 
2 69.171.230.0/24  2 20 
... ...  ... ... 





Figure 4: The architecture of Hop-Count Filtering module 
 
c. Decision Maker 
Decision Maker module gives a decision to the 
PostDecode module depended on the outputs of the PIEF 
and HCF modules. Drop signal alerts the PostDecode 
module if either PIEF or HCF realizes a sign of DDoS 
attack. Otherwise, bypass signal is sent to PostDecode to 
allow the packet to go to the network. 
 
C. Experiments 
In this section, we implement and test the system using a 
NetFPGA 10G board. 
 
a. System Implementation 
The NetFPGA 10G [20] board is used to develop DDoS 
countermeasure architecture. The board includes four SFP+ 
ports, Xilinx Virtex-5 TX240T. Four SFP+ ports are suitable 
to build network applications. Besides, Xilinx Virtex-5 
TX240T provides powerful hardware to handle huge traffic 
on the Internet. We use HDL to develop the following 
modules: 
• The PreDecode module: This module receives raw 
packets from network interface via AIX interface 
[21]. After that, this module provides the decoded 
fields to DDoS Filtering modules and forwards the 
original packets to the Packet FIFO module. 
• The Packet FIFO module: This module functions as a 
FIFO, which is provided by Xilinx. The configuration 
of Packet FIFO is 256-bits in width and 1024 entries 
in depth. With that configuration, the Packet FIFO 
module stores minimum 21 packets in 1500 bytes of 
size and maximum 512 packets in 64 bytes of size. 
• The PostDecode module: The functionality of this 
module is to send packets to 10G NIC TX through 
AXI interface. The PostDecode module receives 
control signals from the Decision Maker module. 
Depending on the signals, the PostDecode module 
decides whether the packets are dropped out from the 
system or forwarded to the network. 
• The Port Ingress/Egress Filtering module: This 
module consists of two components: CAM and 
Comparator. The CAM consists of sixteen ranges of 
IP address as describe in Figure 3. The Comparator 
compares the IP address of incoming packets with 
CAM.  
• The Hop-Count Filtering module: This module 
consists of three components: CAM, Comparator, and 
Register Array as describe in Figure 4. According to 
the limitation of NetFPGA 10G board's resources, we 
only build two versions of CAM, 128 and 256 
entries. 
• The Decision Maker module: This module gives final 
decisions to the Base System component based on the 
decision signals from the PIEF and HCF modules. 
Either the PIEF or HCF sends DROP signal, the 
Decision Maker instantly turns on DROP signals to 
the PostDecode module. Otherwise, the Decision 
Maker sends BYPASS signals to the PostDecode 
module.  
The system is synthesized by ISE 13.4 without any 
manual optimization. Table 3 shows hardware resources 
usage of the system. The system, which implements 128 
entries of CAM, runs at 118.907 MHz, utilizes 38.99% 
Registers, and 44.75% BlockRAMs/FIFOs. 
 
Table 3  
Device utilization summary of the system 
 
Module Max Clock Frequency (MHz) Registers 
BlockRAM/FIFO 
(KBytes) 
System 118.907 58,384 5,220 
PreDecode 262.522 1061 36 
Packet FIFO 170.023 423 468 
PIEF 247.452 111 108 
HCF 120.043 1933 4,608 
 
b. Experimental Setup 
To measure the accuracy and throughput of the system, 
we deployed a testing model as shown in Figure 5. 
NetFPGA 10G boards and Open Source Network Tester 
(OSNT) [22] were used for both throughput and accuracy 
testing model. OSNT is a flexible tool. It can generate and 
capture packets of any size at the line-rate speed of 10Gbps. 
In the accuracy testing model, three computers functioned as 
zombies to attack the system, another one was a normal 
user.  
The throughput testing model was used to test decoding 
speed. We prepared TCP/UDP packets with various sizes 
from 64 to 1500 bytes. The packets were sent out at the 
maximum speed of OSNT Generator. We used OSNT 
Monitor to measure the throughput.  
In the accuracy testing model, we tested the combination of 
two filters: PIEF and HCF. We prepared TCP/UDP packets 
with various sizes. Some of those packets were real and 
collected from the Internet to test HCF. Some packets were 
generated to test PIEF. Classified packets were captured to 
evaluate and find out the detection rate (DR), false positive 
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rates (FPR) and false negative rates (FNR). The 
NetFPGA_01 classifies packets, bypasses legitimate packets 
to NetFPGA_02 and forwards spoofed packets to 
NetFPGA_03. 
 
D. Experimental Results 
Figure 6 shows throughput values of the experimental 
system. The vertical axial shows throughput value in Gbps. 
The horizontal axial shows packet size of test cases in Byte. 
For each test case of packet size, the left, middle and right 
columns show packet decoding speed in half-duplex mode, 
full-duplex mode, and the packet generating speed of OSNT 
respectively. Based on the results in Figure 6, the throughput 
of the system nearly reaches the maximum speed of packet 
generator in half-duplex mode and achieves 9.869 Gbps. In 
full-duplex mode, the system in stable condition achieves 
twice the throughput of half-duplex mode and up to 19.738 
Gbps, except test case of 64-Byte packets. The low 
throughput value in the full-duplex mode of the 64-Byte test 
case may be due to the experience of the developer in 
dealing with small packet size.  
Table 4 shows the statistical values of accuracy test of the 
system. The results were collected by evaluating captured 
classified packets. We repeated the test case twice in each 
version of CAM. In all test cases, the DR is up to 100%, the 
FNRs are 0%. In 128 entries CAM test cases, FPRs are 0%. 
In 256 entries CAM test cases, FPRs are close to 0.16%.  
We also did statistic calculation based on packet size. Figure 
7 shows the DR, FPR, and FNR of the experimental system 
based on packet size and CAM version. The packets are 
classified into 6 groups: 0-64 Bytes, 64-128 Bytes, 128-256 
Bytes, 256-512 Bytes, 512-1024 Bytes and 1024-1500 
Bytes. In all test cases, the DRs are 100%, FNRs are 0%. In 
128 entries CAM version, the FPRs are 0%. In 256 entries 
CAM version, the FPRs vary, but they are downtrend on 
uptrend of the packet size; the values are 0.33%, 0.74%, 














Table 4  











Legitimate 286,162 286,162 0 
Spoofed 13,838 0 13,838 
2 
Legitimate 286,162 286,162 0 




Legitimate 266,757 266,319 438 
Spoofed 33,243 0 33,243 
2 
Legitimate 266,757 266,285 472 








In this paper, we proposed a novel architecture to defend 
against DDoS attacks using reconfigurable hardware. The 
architecture, which separates algorithms from the base 
system, helps developers to focus on optimizing filtering 
modules. The Base System component provides high-speed 
packet decoder and helps reducing system latency. Our 
DDoS countermeasure mechanism combines PIEF and HCF 
modules. With our approach, the packet decoding speed of 
the system reaches to 9.869 Gbps in half-duplex mode and 
19.738 Gbps in full-duplex mode. Moreover, the 
combination of PIEF and HCF improves the DR up to 
100%, higher than 90% of [5] and 99.33% of [18], with 
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